

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ANP 48608

By 04 NARA Date 9/24/10

LGB

PARKER MELVIN A
80 STATE 154183

08/18/80 122907 PRINTER: LL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 154183

ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-10 L-03

ACDA-12 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 SP-02 TRSE-00 H-01

NSCE-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 CSCE-04 SMS-01 /066 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:RSPACE:PMW

APPROVED BY EUR/RPM:CHTHOMAS

DOD:DR. L DAVIS

-----028960 120259Z /14

O 112002Z JUN 80 ZEX

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE

USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 154183

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/10/86 (THOMAS, CHARLES H.)

TAGS: NATO, MPOL, MNUC, NPG

SUBJECT: NPG: DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: AT ITS JUNE 3 DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE, THE NPG FOCUSED ON THE ORAL BRIEFING PROVIDED BY SECDEF BROWN ON U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE, INCLUDING THE CHANGES IN OUR STRATEGY WHICH HAVE COME ABOUT RECENTLY IN THE LIGHT OF STRATEGIC PARITY AND THE ADVENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES. IN THEIR COMMENTS, MINISTERS ELICITED ADDITIONAL CLARIFYING INFORMATION ON CURRENT U.S. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, WHILE ALSO INQUIRING ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ERW DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 154183

ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE FOR WARFIGHTING, AND ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SALT II RATIFICATION IN THE CURRENT YEAR. END SUMMARY.

3. THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF U.S. STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE TOOK PLACE AT THE JUNE 3 SESSION OF THE SPRING 1980 NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) MINISTERIAL IN BODO, NORWAY. THE DISCUSSION OCCURRED UNDER AGENDA ITEM I, ENTITLED "BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR FORCES AND RELATED ISSUES."

- INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

4. SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS OPENED THE MEETING BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY FOR HOSTING THE 27TH MEETING OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. HE ALSO EXTENDED A WELCOME TO THOSE NPG DELEGATES WHO WERE ATTENDING FOR THE FIRST TIME: POSWICK (BELGIUM), LAMONTAGNE (CANADA), LAGORIO (ITALY), BIRINCIUGLU (TURKEY) AND AMARO DA COSTA (PORTUGAL). PARTICULAR NOTE WAS TAKEN

SECRET

PAGE 1

12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

PARKER MELVIN A
80 STATE 154183

08/18/80 122908 PRINTER: LL

SECRET

OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO JOIN THE WORK OF THE NPG. AMARO DA COSTA, IN TURN, THANKED THE CHAIRMAN, STATING THAT HIS PRESENCE DEMONSTRATED PORTUGAL'S INTEREST IN AND SUPPORT FOR THE WORK OF THE NPG, AS WELL AS ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE ALLIANCE AND THE MATURITY OF THE YOUNG PORTUGUESE DEMOCRACY.

5. CHAIRMAN LUNS ALSO RECOGNIZED THE PRESENCE OF THE MNCS AND THE CMC, NOTING THAT GENERAL ZEINER GUNDERSEN WAS ATTENDING HIS LAST NPG; HE WOULD BE LEAVING THE POST OF CMC SHORTLY. THE MEETING THANKED GENERAL GUNDERSEN FOR HIS SIGNAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATO, AND TO THE WORK OF THE NPG.

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 154183

- SECDEF BRIEFING ON STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

6. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN THEN GAVE AN ORAL BRIEFING ON U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE, NOTING THAT OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE CONTINUES TO BE DETERRENCE OF THE FULL RANGE OF POSSIBLE ATTACKS ON THE US, ITS FORCES OR OUR ALLIES. TO IMPLEMENT THIS STRATEGY, THE US SEEKS TO CONVINCED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT THEY COULD NOT WIN A NUCLEAR WAR. A FUNDAMENTAL FEATURE OF THIS COUNTRVAILING STRATEGY IS THE PROPOSITION THAT DETERRENCE, IN AN AGE OF STRATEGIC PARITY, REQUIRES THAT WE HAVE FORCES AND PLANS FOR THEIR USE, OVER THE FULL RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES, SO THAT THE USSR RECOGNIZES THAT NO PLAUSIBLE OUTCOME OF AGGRESSION COULD BE DEFINED AS A VICTORY.

7. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE CONTEXT, BROWN NOTED, NUCLEAR WEAPONS USAGE DOCTRINE IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT, SINCE IT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH AND SUPPORTIVE OF OUR PROCLAIMED WILLINGNESS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE FAILS. TO THIS END, WE NEED PLANS FOR BATTLEFIELD USE AND FOR RELATIVELY LIMITED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT, IN ADDITION, WE MUST HAVE PLANS AND CAPABILITIES TO USE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN LARGER, BUT STILL LESS THAN ALL-OUT STRIKES. DETERRENCE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE RESULT OF WAR WILL BE EITHER FRUSTRATION IN ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVES OR UNACCEPTABLE COSTS, OUT OF PROPORTION TO ANY GAINS. CONCURRENTLY, WE ALSO NEED A SURVIVABLE AND ENDURING CAPABILITY IN OUR OWN NUCLEAR FORCES, SUFFICIENT TO ATTACK, IF REQUIRED, A BROADER SET OF INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC TARGETS.

- STEPS TO IMPLEMENT.

8. BROWN FURTHER STATED THAT THIS POLICY REQUIRES SOME

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 154183

CHANGES IN OUR STRATEGIC WAR PLANS, ESPECIALLY INTRODUCTION OF MORE FLEXIBILITY, IN THE FORM OF PRE-PLANNED ATTACK ALTERNATIVES. THESE CHANGES WILL PERMIT US TO

SECRET

12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 48608

By 04 NARA Date 9/24/10

PARKER MELVIN A
80 STATE 154183

08/18/80 122909 PRINTER: LL

SECRET

USE MORE EFFECTIVELY THE INHERENT CAPABILITIES THAT NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES SUCH AS MIRVS AND ALCMS GIVE OUR FORCES FOR FLEXIBILITY IN EMPLOYMENT. NEW PLANNED REVISIONS TO THE SIOF WILL PROVIDE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE OPTIONS FOR OUR CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES. IN GENERAL, THE NEW OPTIONS WILL BE ORIENTED TOWARD INCREASING OUR PREPLANNED CAPABILITY TO STRIKE WITH MORE DISCRIMINATION AT MILITARILY-SIGNIFICANT SUBSETS OF THE TOTAL TARGET SYSTEM. WE ARE ALSO IMPROVING OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT A SUSTAINED EXCHANGE, REQUIRING IMPROVED ENDURANCE IN OUR FORCES, ESPECIALLY IN THE CSI SUPPORT, AND SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC FORCES HELD IN RESERVE.

9. SUMMARIZING HIS VIEWS, BROWN ADDED THAT WE HAVE NO ILLUSION THAT A LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR COULD BE EITHER A SENSIBLE, DELIBERATE INSTRUMENT OF US/ALLIANCE POLICY OR A MEANS OF ATTAINING VICTORY FOR OURSELVES. LIKEWISE, WE ARE AWARE OF THE IMMENSE UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED. FURTHER, NO THEORY OF EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN COMPENSATE FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE WEAKNESS. NONETHELESS, IT IS LEGITIMATE AND IMPORTANT TO PLAN FOR POSSIBLE NUCLEAR EXCHANGES, AS A MEANS TO DETER SOVIET ACTIONS. WHILE OUR OBJECTIVES SET A HIGH STANDARD, IT IS ONE WE CAN CONTINUE TO MEET, BOTH BY OUR NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, WHICH INCREASE THE POTENTIAL OF OUR FORCES, AND BY OUR PLANNING TO EXPLOIT THAT POTENTIAL IF NEEDED.

- INTERVENTION BY OTHER MINISTERS

10. LAMONTAGNE (CANADA) THANKED SECDEF BROWN FOR HIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 154183

BRIEFING, NOTING THAT CANADA BELIEVES THAT NUCLEAR PLANNING IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIANCE, FOR TWO REASONS: (1) AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY, AND (2) BECAUSE ANY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD HAVE PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS FOR ALL. FOR THESE REASONS, HE ADDED, CANADA SUPPORTED THE ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. RECENTLY, LAMONTAGNE ADDED, HE HAD READ OF FRENCH INTEREST IN DEVELOPING AN ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON; HE ASKED WHETHER THAT NEWS HAD ANY BEARING ON U.S. DECISIONS.

11. BROWN REPLIED THAT HE HAD SEEN SIMILAR REPORTS, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW HOW WELL-FOUNDED THEY ARE. THE US ALREADY HAS DEVELOPED AN ERW, AND IT IS NOW A QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT. THE US HAS RETAINED THE OPTION TO DEPLOY ERWS IN THOSE SYSTEMS WHICH WILL ACCEPT THEM. BUT IT IS NOT A MATTER THAT IS HIGH ON OUR AGENDA. THE SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD ACCEPT ER WARHEADS ARE THE LANCE AND CERTAIN ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, DEPLOYED IN EUROPE, BUT THE US HAS NOT PRODUCED ANY SUCH WARHEADS. THE DEVELOPMENT WORK HAS BEEN DONE, AND PRODUCTION WOULD NOT TAKE LONG.

12. SCHOLTEN (NETHERLANDS) ASKED IF IT IS CONFIRMED THAT

SECRET

PAGE 3

PARKER MELVIN A
80 STATE 154183

08/18/80 122911 PRINTER: LL

SECRET

SOME SS-20S COULD BE EQUIPPED WITH 4 MIRVS. HE ALSO INQUIRED IF THE SS-4S AND SS-5S, WHICH APPARENTLY ARE NOT BEING PHASED-OUT IN STEP WITH SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS, ARE BEING UPGRADED OR RETAINED AS BARGAINING CHIPS. BROWN REPLIED THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY TESTS WITH 4 MIRVS ON THE SS-20. THERE MAY BE CONFUSION BETWEEN NUMBERS OF RELOADS AND NUMBERS OF MIRVS. WE BELIEVE THE SS-20 HAS A RELOAD CAPABILITY OF PERHAPS AS HIGH AS THREE, MAKING A TOTAL OF FOUR. HOWEVER, CONVINCING EVIDENCE IS ONLY AVAILABLE FOR ONE RELOAD, MAKING A TOTAL OF TWO. ON SS-4S AND 5S, OUR SPECULATION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SAVING THEM FOR TNF NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 154183

13. AMARO DA COSTA (PORTUGAL) ASKED IF BROWN COULD DEVELOP A FEW POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COUNTERVAILING STRATEGY IN US NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BROWN NOTED THAT WE HAVE MADE SOME STATEMENTS ABOUT THIS STRATEGY, AND WILL BE SAYING MORE PUBLICLY. THE SOVIET VERBAL REACTION HAS BEEN THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF LAUNCHING A NUCLEAR WAR, AND THAT THIS IS JUST MORE US WARMONGERING. HOWEVER, SOVIET CLASSIFIED MILITARY WRITINGS, AND EVIDENCE FROM THEIR EXERCISES, DO INDICATE THAT THEY HAVE PLANS FOR ATTACKS ON MILITARY FORCES, AND FOR HOLDING BACK A RESERVE OF WEAPONS FOR OTHER TARGETS. BROWN ADDED THAT HE, PERSONALLY, HAD NEVER TAKEN THE VIEW THAT AN ATTACK ON US LAND-BASED ICBMS WOULD BE THE END OF THE WAR. IF THE SOVIETS CAN BE MADE TO REALIZE THAT A WIDE RANGE OF TARGETS ARE OPEN TO ATTACK, INCLUDING THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES AND FORCES ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER, IT SHOULD GIVE THEM CAUSE TO THINK. BROWN FURTHER STATED THAT THEORIZING IS OF DOUBTFUL VALUE, AND THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME OF A LIMITED EXCHANGE IS AN UNLIMITED EXCHANGE. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO ESTABLISH A STRATEGY TO WIN A NUCLEAR WAR, BUT SAYING YOU CANNOT WIN DOES NOT MEAN THE OTHER SIDE CAN WIN

14. APEL (FRG) SAID THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR WITHDRAWING SALT II FROM THE US SENATE IN REACTION TO AFGHANISTAN, BUT ASKED WHAT IS THE LIKELY WAY AHEAD? BROWN RESPONDED THAT SALT II HAS NOT ACTUALLY BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE SENATE, IT IS NOT ON THE CALENDAR BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GET THE NECESSARY TWO-THIRDS VOTE WHILE THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN CONTINUES. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE SITUATION WILL CHANGE SO AS TO MAKE RATIFICATION POSSIBLE THIS YEAR, ALTHOUGH WE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 154183

CANNOT ABSOLUTELY RULE THAT OUT IF THERE WERE A SUITABLE REACTION BY THE SOVIETS TO WORLD OR ALLIANCE PRESSURE. AFGHANISTAN HAS CAUSED SALT II TO BE PLACED IN SUSPENDED

SECRET

PAGE 4

12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 48608

By 04 NARA Date 9/24/10

PARKER MELVIN A
80 STATE 154183

08/18/80 122911 PRINTER: LL

SECRET

ANIMATION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO LIMIT OUR FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALT II; THIS IS NOT ANYWAY, A SEVERE LIMITATION ON US, AND IT FITS OUR PLANS. WHAT WOULD CAUSE A RE-EXAMINATION OF OUR FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD BE AN EXPANSION OF SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

15. PYM (UK) CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY EXPRESSING GRATITUDE FOR SECRETARY BROWN'S PRESENTATION, BECAUSE IT IS IMPORTANT TO RE-STATE OUR POLICY FOR TWO REASONS: (1) FOR PUBLIC PERCEPTION PURPOSES, SINCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE HERE, AND CANNOT BE "DIS-INVENTED." PEOPLE THUS WANT TO KNOW WHY WE HAVE THEM, WHY WE NEED THEM AND WE MUST NEVER BE AFRAID TO TEST THE ARGUMENT; ALSO, (2) STRATEGY MUST CHANGE BECAUSE THE THREAT CHANGES. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS BE EXPLAINED, NOT ONLY IN THE NPG BUT OUTSIDE. PEOPLE HAVE NOT REALIZED, INCLUDING IN THE UK, THE CHANGED SCALE OF THE SOVIET THREAT. THEN THERE IS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVINCING THE SOVIETS AS WELL; WE HAVE NO WAY OF REACHING THE SOVIET PEOPLE, BUT WE MUST REACH THEIR LEADERSHIP. MUSKIE

SECRET

12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3